Dual federalism

Dual federalism, also known as layer-cake federalism or divided sovereignty, is a political arrangement in which power is divided between the federal and state governments in clearly defined terms, with state governments exercising those powers accorded to them without interference from the federal government. Dual federalism is defined in contrast to cooperative federalism ('marble-cake federalism'), in which federal and state governments collaborate on policy. Dual federalism, also known as layer-cake federalism or divided sovereignty, is a political arrangement in which power is divided between the federal and state governments in clearly defined terms, with state governments exercising those powers accorded to them without interference from the federal government. Dual federalism is defined in contrast to cooperative federalism ('marble-cake federalism'), in which federal and state governments collaborate on policy. The system of dual/joint federalism in the United States is a product of the backlash against the Articles of Confederation, ratified in 1781, which established a very weak federal government with the powers to declare war, make treaties, and maintain an army. Fueled by Shays' Rebellion and an economy faltering under the inability of the federal government to pay the debt from the American Revolution, a group later known as the Federalists generated support for a strong central government and called for a Constitutional Convention in 1787 to reconsider the Articles. In 1787, the Convention almost immediately dropped its original purpose of editing the Articles and instead drafted a new Constitution of the United States. Rejecting both confederal and unitary systems, they based the new American government on a new theory of federalism, a system of shared sovereignty that delegates some powers to the federal government and reserves other powers for the states. Among other powers, the federal legislature could now tax citizens and maintain a standing military, and had exclusive power over regulating interstate commerce and coining currency. In addition, while Article Six of the Constitution stipulated that federal law in pursuit of constitutionally assigned ends overrode any contradictory state law, the power of the national government was held in check by the Bill of Rights – particularly the Tenth Amendment, which limited federal governmental powers to only those specified in the Constitution. Importantly, at the Convention, there was large debate over the structure of the legislative branch, eventually solved by the Connecticut Compromise. In the traditional understanding of the discussion, the larger states proposed the Virginia Plan, which allocated representation to each state proportional to its population. The smaller states, fearing a tyranny of the larger states, propose the New Jersey Plan, which gave each state equal representation in the legislative body. The states' motives for such a debate have been largely understood as a method for ensuring a strong voice in the federal government so as to maintain a desired degree of sovereignty. Further, political scientist Martin Diamond interprets the argument through a federalist vs antifederalist lens, discounting the question of state size. Specifically, he argues that the pure federalism of the New Jersey Plan and the pure nationalism of the Virginia Plan eventually came together to form the system of bicameralism that the framers settled on. However, his theory largely goes against the usual understanding, which some have argued is based on stronger historical evidence. Since the initial division of state and federal powers – collectively, the system of dual federalism – put forth by the Constitution, several seminal court cases have helped further clarify the purview of the federal government. One such case, McCulloch v. Maryland, concerned the constitutionality of a federally chartered bank, which bankers and many legislators in Maryland opposed. Although the ability to charter a bank had not been explicitly granted to the federal government in the Constitution, federalist proponents argued such action as necessary for the federal government to exercise its constitutional power to “tax, borrow, and regulate interstate commerce.” The Supreme Court, in essence, backed Alexander Hamilton's interpretation of the Constitution over Thomas Jefferson. Thus, the banks legitimacy was ensured by the Necessary and Proper Clause. A second major case regarding the respective rights of the state and federal government was Gibbons v. Ogden (1824). In 1808, the Fulton-Livingston Company had been granted exclusive steamboat rights by the New York legislature, who in turn had leased ferry rights within a portion of New York to Aaron Ogden. Ogden, citing the monopoly granted to him by the Fulton-Livingstone Company, had successfully prevented Thomas Gibbons from operating a ferry service between Manhattan and New Jersey. Chief Justice Marshall’s majority opinion sided with Gibbons, stating that Ogden's monopoly of the ferry service overstepped states’ ability to regulate trade. While the constitutionality of some aspects implied by the case remained vague, the decision once more reaffirmed the supremacy of federal law and diminished the power of state-sanctioned protectionism. In the decades before the Civil War, both Northern and Southern states clashed with the national government over perceived overreaches in its power. These conflicts struck at the heart of dual federalism, and reflected a fundamental disagreement about the division of power between the national and state levels. While these political battles were ostensibly solved either through legislative compromise or Supreme Court decisions, the underlying tensions and disagreements about states’ rights would later help set the stage for the Civil War. In 1828, the so-called “Tariff of Abominations” passed the U.S. House. It was meant as a protectionist measure to help the relatively industrialized New England states against international products, but this had grave implications for the largely agrarian South. In protest and spearheaded by Vice President John Calhoun, South Carolina formulated a ‘Nullification Doctrine’, in effect claiming a state’s ability to ignore federal law, and rejected the tariff. The situation became especially serious when President Jackson ordered federal troops into Charleston, though crisis was averted by the drafting of a new tariff to which both sides agreed. The crisis illustrated an example of conflicting ideologies on state and federal power that was not resolved through the courts, but with discussion between elected officials. While some Southern states resisted economic actions of the federal government, several Northern states balked at federal requirements regarding slavery. In 1842, the case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania concerned Edward Prigg, who had been found guilty of kidnapping a former slave residing in Pennsylvania, Margaret Morgan, and her children and bringing them to her former owner in Maryland. Prigg was charged according to Pennsylvania law, which considered such an action a felony, while Prigg argued that he had been duly appointed for the task and was within the bounds of the federal Fugitive Slave Act of 1793. The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Pennsylvania law unconstitutional, striking the abolitionist law and heightening tensions between slaveholding and non-slaveholding states.