language-icon Old Web
English
Sign In

Common cause and special cause

Random effectsSystematic effectsCommon and special causes are the two distinct origins of variation in a process, as defined in the statistical thinking and methods of Walter A. Shewhart and W. Edwards Deming. Briefly, 'common causes', also called natural patterns, are the usual, historical, quantifiable variation in a system, while 'special causes' are unusual, not previously observed, non-quantifiable variation. Common and special causes are the two distinct origins of variation in a process, as defined in the statistical thinking and methods of Walter A. Shewhart and W. Edwards Deming. Briefly, 'common causes', also called natural patterns, are the usual, historical, quantifiable variation in a system, while 'special causes' are unusual, not previously observed, non-quantifiable variation. The distinction is fundamental in philosophy of statistics and philosophy of probability, with different treatment of these issues being a classic issue of probability interpretations, being recognised and discussed as early as 1703 by Gottfried Leibniz; various alternative names have been used over the years. The distinction has been particularly important in the thinking of economists Frank Knight, John Maynard Keynes and G. L. S. Shackle. In 1703, Jacob Bernoulli wrote to Gottfried Leibniz to discuss their shared interest in applying mathematics and probability to games of chance. Bernoulli speculated whether it would be possible to gather mortality data from gravestones and thereby calculate, by their existing practice, the probability of a man currently aged 20 years outliving a man aged 60 years. Leibniz replied that he doubted this was possible: Nature has established patterns originating in the return of events but only for the most part. New illnesses flood the human race, so that no matter how many experiments you have done on corpses, you have not thereby imposed a limit on the nature of events so that in the future they could not vary. This captures the central idea that some variation is predictable, at least approximately in frequency. This common-cause variation is evident from the experience base. However, new, unanticipated, emergent or previously neglected phenomena (e.g. 'new diseases') result in variation outside the historical experience base. Shewhart and Deming argued that such special-cause variation is fundamentally unpredictable in frequency of occurrence or in severity. John Maynard Keynes emphasised the importance of special-cause variation when he wrote: By 'uncertain' knowledge ... I do not mean merely to distinguish what is known for certain from what is only probable. The game of roulette is not subject, in this sense, to uncertainty ... The sense in which I am using the term is that in which the prospect of a European war is uncertain, or the price of copper and the rate of interest twenty years hence, or the obsolescence of a new invention ... About these matters there is no scientific basis on which to form any calculable probability whatever. We simply do not know! Common-cause variation is characterised by:

[ "Operations management", "Statistics", "Reliability engineering", "Disease", "Mitochondrial Recessive Ataxia Syndrome" ]
Parent Topic
Child Topic
    No Parent Topic