Stackelberg Stability in the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution: Definition and Implementation

This paper proposes a new algebraic definition that facilities calculating of Stackelberg stability in a graph model for conflict resolution with two decision makers. Most stability definitions used in the graph model methodology place decision makers at the same level, in the sense that their roles are symmetric. In practice, however, one decision maker may join by forcing the other to respond to his or her decision. So, to be applied, a model must specify the leader and the follower. Stackelberg stability can be defined logically, but an algorithm to implement it has not been developed until now, due to its complicated recursive formula. To permit Stackelberg stability to be calculated efficiently and encoded conveniently, within a decision support system, an algebraic test for the stability is developed. This algebraic representation of Stackelberg stability is easy to implement and interpret. A superpower military confrontation is used to illustrate how Stackelberg stability can be employed to a real-world application using the new approach.