89 Russias: The Role of Formal Institutions in Explaining Executive Contestation

Under what conditions do executive incumbents consolidate their rule in hybrid regimes and complete the transition to stable authoritarianism? Can independent legislatures hinder ambitious executives even under presidential constitutions? Some existing explanations of democratic successes and failures emphasize structural factors such as level of economic development and resource endowment. Others highlight the role of formal institutions, particularly constitutional drafting and the perils of unlimited executive authority. This paper contributes to the latter tradition by o ering fresh evidence and further theorization drawn on cases located at the subnational level.At the center of it is a systematic e ort to explore the role of stronger legislatures in preventing authoritarian consolidation while controlling for relevant factors identi ed in the literature. I use provincial-level data from gubernatorial elections in a hybrid post-communist federation (Russia 1992-2005) to identify the factors that lead to elections without genuine contestation. These are races where the margin of victory of the incumbent is so wide that the uncertainty of outcome is non-existent. The analysis provides evidence of formal institutions, speci cally autonomous legislatures, exerting an independent positive e ect on executive contestation alongside traditional predictors. Conversely, rubber stamp bodies are associated with an over-extended tenure of incumbent governors and consolidation of authoritarian rule.