Centralized vs Decentralized Targeted Brute-Force Attacks: Guessing With Side-Information

According to recent empirical studies, a majority of users have the same, or very similar, passwords across multiple password-secured online services. This practice can have disastrous consequences, as one password being compromised puts all the other accounts at much higher risk. Generally, an adversary may use any side-information he/she possesses about the user, be it demographic information, password reuse on a previously compromised account, or any other relevant information to devise a better brute-force strategy (so called targeted attack). In this work, we consider a distributed brute-force attack scenario in which $m$ adversaries, each observing some side information, attempt breaching a password secured system. We compare two strategies: an uncoordinated attack in which the adversaries query the system based on their own side-information until they find the correct password, and a fully coordinated attack in which the adversaries pool their side-information and query the system together. For passwords X of length $n$ , generated independently and identically from a distribution $P_{X}$ , we establish an asymptotic closed-form expression for the uncoordinated and coordinated strategies when the side-information $\mathrm {Y}_{(m)}$ are generated independently from passing X through a memoryless channel $P_{Y|X}$ , as the length of the password $n$ goes to infinity. We illustrate our results for binary symmetric channels and binary erasure channels, two families of side-information channels which model password reuse. We demonstrate that two coordinated agents perform asymptotically better than any finite number of uncoordinated agents for these channels, meaning that sharing side-information is very valuable in distributed attacks.