The role of analysts in negative information production and disclosure: Evidence from short selling deregulation in an emerging market

Abstract Leveraging from the recent short sales deregulation in China, we examine whether analyst optimism bias increases or decreases in the presence of short sales. We use a novel approach of conducting a textual analysis of research reports to quantify analysts’ negative tone on their covered stocks to proxy for their negative information production and disclosure both pre- and post-short sales deregulation. Using a difference-in-differences approach, our findings suggest that, after short sales deregulation, analysts engage in more negative information production and disclosure as revealed by a more negative tone in their analyst reports. The findings are robust to a battery of checks. Additional analysis suggests that when a covered firm obtains future financing or has high institutional ownership, the extent of negative analyst tone in research reports weakens, indicating that analyst conflicts of interest continue to affect analyst research optimism. Finally, we document that negative information production and disclosure by analysts mediates the impact of short sales deregulation on stock price idiosyncratic volatility and cumulative abnormal return, which suggests the important role of analysts in capital market efficiency.