Autonomy, paternalism, and institutional interest: why some conflicts can't be waived

This paper asks the question of why, in some cases, a client is precluded from demanding of their lawyer that they act for them and their adversary simultaneously. We accept that in numerous instances a lawyer can act for clients whose interests may diverge (or in some cases do in fact diverge) providing informed consent has been obtained. This paper enquires as to why the line between waivable and non-waivable conflicts is drawn where it is, and examines the theoretical underpinning of the waiver rule and its boundaries. It does so by first looking at the client autonomy argument for allowing waivers. It then turns to explore the paternalistic justifications for rendering a consensual waiver of a conflict inoperative. Finally it looks at those cases where a waiver is not permitted that are left unexplained by paternalism. It argues that paternalism, properly understood, is a legitimate justification for most refusals to accept a waiver of conflict. However, a residual body of cases remain unexplained by ...