A Meta-Game Model for Fair Division in Climate Negotiation

This article deals with the problem of fair sharing of a safety cumulative emissions budget up to 2050 where the safety emissions budget is determined chiey by climate science. Using climate models one may infer the temperature change due to dierent possible emission pathways provided by world techno-economic models. From these simulations one can identify emissions pathways that keep the temperature increase below threshold levels that should not be overtaken. Now the negotiation could concentrate on the fair sharing of the resulting safety cumulative budget over the time horizon 2010-2050. We assume that an international emissions trading system is the instrument chosen to realize the transfers leading to equity, while retaining eciency in the abatement activities. We use an integrated assessment model to propose sharings of the safety budget which satisfy some Rawlsian equity criteria when one computes the net welfare eect for the dierent countries of the optimal supply of quotas corresponding to the relative shares of the emission budget, at dierent period, on the international emissions trading market. The approach is based on GEMINI-E3, a computable general economic equilibrium model, which is coupled with the climate model of intermediate complexity PLASIM-ENTS. Here the supply of quotas at each period is decided strategically by the regions involved in the negotiations. The equity criterion is The research leading to these results has received funding from the EU Seventh Framework Pro