A comparative study on recycling amount and rate of used products under different regulatory scenarios

Abstract Used products recycling is a cleaner and greener mode of production. The multiple uncertainties in the process of recycling and reproduction require appropriate government regulation. On the basis of classical game theory, the positive influence of cooperative social reputation is also considered, and a dynamic Stackelberg game model dominated by manufacturers is constructed. The comparison of the total market demand for products, the number of used products recycled and the recycle rate of used products can be obtained under four different scenarios. In addition to the business as usual (BAU) scenario, any kind of scenarios represent the corresponding regulatory policy. The results show that, with respect to the BAU scenario, the penalty scenario and the reward-penalty scenario have a positive correlation with the recycling rate of used products, while the reward scenario has a negative correlation with the recycling rate. The impact of the reward-penalty scenario on the total market demand for products, cooperative social reputation and the number of used products recycled is related to the specified recycling rate, set by the government. In the end, the validity of the model is verified through numerical simulation and the sensitivity of the relevant parameters under the reward-penalty scenario are analysed. The conclusion of this paper is of great significance for designing precise policies to promote recycling of used products.