Curbing overstocking on rangeland through subsidies, rewards, and herders’ social capital: Lessons from Qinghai province, China

Abstract Restoring rangeland ecology, a goal set by the Rangeland Ecological Protection Subsidy and Reward (REPSR) scheme of China, depends on how effectively livestock overload can be curbed. Besides subsidies and rewards, herders' individual social capital also bears an important weight on their willingness to lower stocking rate. Social network offers an invisible conduit for herders to build up social capital, thus quantifying social capital through social network analysis is more straightforward than simply using proxy indicators, an approach commonly adopted so far. Based on a questionnaire survey on 288 households in Qinghai province, the effects of social capital and the REPSR compensation on stocking rate are empirically examined, replacing the traditional proxies of social capital with herders' ability to obtain information and resources as well as the restrictions imposed by social norms from social networks. Social capital is found to have a statistically significant impact on stocking rate, but tradeoffs exist among various network pathways. Herders’ acquisition of policy information and stall-feeding skills through social networks contributes to lower stocking rate, but acquisition of grazing experience, funds and machinery service exerts counteracting effects. A U-shaped relationship occurs between stocking rate and compensation amount offered by the REPSR: with the increase of compensation amount, herders lower stocking rate first and then increase it. To improve the effectiveness of the REPSR scheme, a refinement on the compensation scheme tailored to differential scales of household rangeland operation is the key, meanwhile weaving and harnessing social network to improve policy publicity and enforcement as well as knowledge sharing and production cooperation between herdsmen also deserve more attention.