The bottom of things : essences for explanation
2014
Central to the philosophy of Aristotle is the belief that the aim of serious
enquiry is knowledge of the constitutive essences of a given field.
Modern scientific essentialism claims that this still holds good, and this
thesis aims to support that approach by elucidating and applying the
original concept of essence. Chapter one argues that Aristotle formulated
his theory of essences entirely in the context of the theory of explanation
expounded in Posterior Analytics. The components of that theory are
explained, and the implications of Aristotle’s view for current debate are
considered. Chapter two examines the reasons for the decline of
Aristotelian essentialism during the scientific revolution, the metaphysical
problems which resulted, and Leibniz’s reasons for defending the older
view. Chapter three considers the nature of explanation in a modern
context, starting with the preconditions for any grasp of reality that are
needed to make explanations possible; it is then argued that only
essentialist explanation can occupy the role which these preconditions
entail. Chapter four surveys the components of that picture of reality that
seem explicable, to see how essentialist explanations would actually be
formulated. The theoretical discussion concludes with an account of
what form essences should take, in order to occupy the explanatory role
that has been assigned to them. The final chapter examines the cases of
counting physical objects, explaining abstract axiomatic systems, and the
discovery of the periodic table of elements, showing how attempts at
explanation in these cases all converge on the sorts of essence which
have been delineated in the thesis.
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