Thinking Fast Thinking Slow: bridging the gap between research and practice in disaster recovery

The Nobel prize winning economist Daniel Kahneman (2012) suggested that we have two ways of thinking. Fast thinking involves intuition and instinctive behaviour while slow thinking demands deliberation and rational analysis. This goes some way to explaining a question that has been preoccupying researchers in the field of remote sensing and information management in the area of disaster recovery. This paper describes using scenario planning game as a tool to improve communication between researchers and practitioners and to better understand what information disaster management decision-makers need. In particular it explores how information is needed at different stages in the recovery process and addresses the question why the take-up of this technology is slower than one might have expected. There have been major research advances in using data collected from satellite and airborne sensors to map hazards, assess post-earthquake damage, manage humanitarian and financial assistance and to plan and monitor long-term recovery. But the take up of this technology by disaster management practitioners and planners is disappointing. Why is this? Can the information not be provided quickly enough to aid decision making, is it too costly or is there a lack of trained personnel to interpret and make use of the information? The first phase of an EU funded project, SENSUM, aimed to address these questions using scenario planning. The information needs of recovery planning were assessed in a series of user needs scenario planning exercises with senior disaster managers in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkey. These realistic earthquake scenarios were played-out during one-day exercises that allowed disaster personnel to simulate the post-earthquake decision making process. The findings pinpoint how information derived from multi-resolution imagery can be effective in planning and assessing recovery of transportation networks, transitional shelters and the built environment. But that the people charged with disaster management have to make choices fast using experience, instinct and following established protocols. They find it difficult to think about using the kind of information research scientists are able to provide. In contrast the people charged with long-term planning are able to plan deliberately and are desperate for detailed and reliable information to help make good decisions. This means two entirely different kinds of information are required – fast and slow information.