Ultralightweight resilient mutual authentication protocol for IoT based edge networks

Confidentiality and authentication are primary concerns of RFID (Radio Frequency IDentification) based identification systems. Low cost, non sight-line scanning capability, unique identification and functional haste make RFID systems much more suitable for supply chain management and IoT networks, compare to barcodes and magnetic tapes. Since, RFID tags can be scanned from a greater distance over a radio channel which is easily accessible for adversaries, therefore numerous Ultralightweight Mutual Authentication Protocols (UMAPs) have been proposed to ensure the security of the RFID systems in a cost effective way. These UMAPs mainly involve low cost bitwise logical ( $$Triangular$$ ) operations such as $$XOR, AND OR$$ etc., usually these logical operations offer poor diffusion properties and hence result in disclosure of the concealed secrets. Almost all of the previous UMAPs have certain pitfalls and reported to be susceptible to Denial of Service, traceability, full disclosure and cloning attacks. In this paper, we propose a new UMAP that is resilient to structured and unstructured cryptanalysis techniques. The proposed Ultralightweight Resilient Mutual Authentication Protocol (URMAP) avoids all the pitfalls and unbalanced operators in its design that were the main reasons of failure of previous UMAPs. The incorporation of ultralightweight primitives; $$Per{\text{-}}XOR$$ ( $${P}_{x})$$ and $$Inverse Per{\text{-}}XOR$$ $$({ P}_{x}^{-1})$$ makes the protocol messages more resistant to all types of adversaries. The security and privacy capabilities of URMAP are evaluated through formal analysis. The results of GNY Logic analysis prove that the proposed protocol is resilient to all possible attack scenarios thus ensuring optimal confidentiality, integrity and availability services.