Controlling insider dealing through criminal enforcement in China

The enforcement of the new Securities Law (SL 2020) of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) in March 2020 presents a perfect opportunity to review the criminal enforcement of insider dealing cases in China’s securities market and to provide feasible suggestions for improvement for a more coherent and streamlined insider dealing regulatory framework in the PRC. Through analysing the previous literature on public interest theories and economic theories of regulation, this article examines the necessity to regulate insider dealing in China with criminal law to ensure fairness and avoid monopolies in its securities market. The article reviews the criminalising of severe insider dealing cases in China from the Nanking National Government in the 1920s to the inception of the securities market of the PRC in the 1990s to the present day. The investigation, prosecution, enforcement, and trial of criminal offences of insider dealing in China are thoroughly examined. The article finds a tendency for over reliance on the investigation and the administrative judgement of the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) in criminal investigation, prosecution, and trial in the PRC. The article is one of the first articles to critically and thoroughly analyse the criminal enforcement of insider dealing in China following the recent enforcement of China’s new Securities Law in March 2020.