Who’s Afraid of Transnational Legal Theory?: Dangers and Desiderata

Abstract The rise in both number and importance of various forms of intra-, inter-, supra- and trans-national legal phenomena presents distinctive challenges for legal philosophers seeking to explain and evaluate such phenomena in their theories of law. This article focuses on one facet of those challenges, namely their relevance for the methodology, or the philosophy, of transnational legal theory. Must we devise new, or, at least, significantly revised, legal philosophical methodologies in order successfully to explain and evaluate the character and distinctiveness of transnational legal phenomena? Or do we merely need to apply, and perhaps somewhat adapt, existing methodological approaches successfully deployed in general legal philosophy, to the particular case of transnational law? These are complex questions, and cannot be tackled in their entirety here. This article hence takes the approach of identifying and exploring some dangers to be overcome or avoided, and some desiderata that we should strive to attain, if our theories of law are to be sufficiently attuned to, and appropriately illuminating regarding, the domain of transnational law. Keywords: Transnational Law; Legal Philosophy; Methodology; Jurisprudence