THE ETHICS OF INQUIRY AND ENGAGEMENT: THE CASE OF SCIENCE IN PUBLIC

There has been a promising discussion brewing recently about whether there is n ethics of inquiry?that s, a unique set of ethical rules that co strains inquirers specifically in their role as inquirers. Most prominently, Philip Kitcher (1997, 2001) has proposed that there is indeed an ethics of inquiry. He argues that, given the intellectual climate of many modern societies, certain research programs are likely to encourage further social injustice against members of already disadvantaged groups; in such cases, inquirers are obligated to refrain from that research, regardless of its expected or likely results. Kitcher has in mind scientific research regarding the natural capacities of members of traditionally underprivileged social groups; he thinks that, given the degree of prejudice and discrimination that obtains in many societies, research into the possibility of a biological basis for differences in accomplishment among different races and sexes should be prohibited, even where the proposed research promises to debunk racist and sexist views. More of the details of Kitcher's prohibitionism will be discussed below, and his view has been challenged elsewhere (Talisse and Aikin 2007). Yet, we think it is worth exploring Kitcher's more general proposal that an independent ethics of inquiry arises when scientific research occurs in societies characterized by both widespread injustice and an intellectual climate wherein scientific results are regu larly misunderstood. We think, with Kitcher, that under such conditions, researchers incur special moral burdens. However, we shall argue that the burden is not that of having to refrain from the research, but that of developing effective communicative programs and having a special circumspection in presenting one's findings.