Putnam's Paradox: A Less Quick Reply to Haukioja and Kroon

1. Does my reply to Putnam turn his 'argumentative strategy on its head, rather than refute it', as Haukioja worries? In brief, I concede the former characterization, but deny the contrast. More specifically, Haukioja's suggestion is reminiscent in spirit of prima facie plausible misgivings attaching to G. E. Moore's (in)famous strategy for refuting scepticism. Consider a two-premissed argument for some sceptical conclusion, ((SPi), (SP2) .'. (SC)); then Moore's famous manoeuvre commenced by observing that, if the sceptical argument is valid, then so is (-(SC) .'. -(SPi) V -(SP2)). Moore then discerned the premiss bearing the least prima facie plausibility (say, (SP2)), and refuted it by pointing out that, since we know (SC) is false, and (we'll suppose) (SPi) is unobjectionable, then we know that (SP2) is false. (See, e.g., (Moore 1953, pp. 135-43).) Nowadays, Moore's 'proofs' seem, at first suspicious blush, unhelpful and even 'question-begging'. Yet given their era, these arguments served their intended purpose. At a time when Bradley-style idealists seriously maintained they knew hands, etc., were 'unreal' (given various idealistic premisses), Moore's proofs invited would-be idealists to re-examine their agenda. Rather than invest subsequent effort into enquiry which presumes the truth of'Hands are unreal', that is, Moore's arguments aimed to provoke would-be idealists to replace their project with an (indirectly) realistic one presuming the falsehood of such odd claims, and proceeding from there. The fulcrum for this methodological lever,