Involuntary delisting in the Japanese stock market

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to analyze the wealth effect of involuntary delisting and investigate insider opportunism and the role of corporate governance, liquidity and legal environment in involuntary delisting in Japan’s stock market. Design/methodology/approach The authors use a sample of 136 involuntarily delisted firms in Japan’s stock markets between 2002 and 2012. The authors examine ownership changes of inside shareholders prior to delisting and estimate regression models for the wealth effect of involuntary delisting. Findings Involuntary delisting is highly disruptive in Japan, and limited liquidity of delisted stocks appears to be an important cause. However, the ownership reduction of inside shareholders before delisting is limited, totaling 2–3 percent. For delisted firms with an insider bank, the decrease in share price leading up to a delisting announcement is much less, while the decrease in share price upon a delisting announcement is far greater. Originality/value The study investigates involuntary delisting in regard to the opportunistic behavior of inside shareholders and the role of institutional environment in Japan’s stock market. Insiders, especially insider banks, maintain ownership in a distressful context leading to the forcible delisting of a distressed firm. The authors find some evidence that suggests that the market believes the insider bank will try to prevent the ailing firm’s insolvency. The findings are consistent with the implicit relational contracts that characterize Japanese firms.