Knowable opportunities in an unknowable future? On the epistemological paradoxes of entrepreneurship theory

Abstract It is often assumed that opportunities can be known ex ante in spite of the fact that the future is simultaneously acknowledged to be unknowable. This paper endeavors to resolve this epistemological paradox in a manner that facilitates a more meaningful treatment of the knowledge problems of entrepreneurship. To this end, we draw from linguistic philosophy and undertake three interrelated analytical steps at the conceptual foundations of entrepreneurship theory. First, we clarify subtle logical aspects underlying the meaningful use of the word “uncertainty” qua unknowability. When properly used, uncertainty reflects the epistemological assessment that enterprising actors may only believe – not know – that new ventures can succeed. When incorrectly used, uncertainty is misrepresented as an obstacle that can be overcome by some and not others. Second, we explain how prevalent linguistic practices (“opportunity discovery”, “opportunity recognition”) lie at the root of epistemological tensions in opportunity theory. They act as a distorting mirror that trivializes the unknowability of the future and nourishes impressions of mental agencies allowing entrepreneurs to know the unknowable. Third, we urge a more nuanced understanding of the knowledge problems of entrepreneurship. On the one hand, we submit that opportunities are ineliminably unknowable. On the other hand, however, we argue that there exist knowable Opportunity-Ingredients (OIs) whose knowability varies across contexts. These analytical developments further contribute to the ongoing “opportunity wars”, strengthen the epistemological foundations of opportunity-actualization, improve construct clarity, and reveal new possibilities for research.