An Efficient Double Auction Mechanism for Job Allocation

Job allocation is a common application of human resource competition in the market. The third-party platform plays a vital role in coordinating the supply relationship between job suppliers and job seekers in order to help the talent market to allocate resources reasonably. For maximal social welfare, this paper proposes and implements a greedy double auction mechanism (GDA) based on the descending order of bid differentials. In the process of auction, virtual positions are regarded as heterogeneous commodities, and greedy algorithm is used to solve the optimal solution which maximizes social welfare and satisfies constraints. GDA has the economic attributes of individual rationality, budget balance as well as authenticity by the theoretical proof. At the same time, the feasibility and effectiveness of the mechanism are verified by simulation experiments. The experimental results show that the GDA mechanism has higher social welfare and average utility of job seekers, which can make job providers and excellent job seekers have a stable foothold in the increasingly fierce human resources competition market.