Executive Authority under the U.S. Constitution to Enter a Pandemic Treaty or International Agreement

In May 2021, the World Health Assembly took the extraordinary measure of calling for a Special Session to consider an international treaty or other agreement to address pandemic prevention, preparedness, and response. That Special Session will take place in late November and early December 2021. Whatever form an international agreement may take, whether binding treaty or precatory recommendation, the shape of the U.S.'s participation will be shaped by its internal constitutional mechanisms. Under the U.S. Constitution, the President may make treaties that become binding federal law with the concurrence of two-thirds of the U.S. Senate. Given the composition of the chamber and U.S. refusal to consider several multilateral treaties over the last several decades, that outcome is remote. However, the U.S. Constitution contemplates other "agreements", "compacts" and understandings that the President may join either through previous treaty accession or statutory authorization from Congress and, in a narrower class of Article II powers, pursuant to his own foreign affairs authority. With focus on how the U.S. joined the Paris Climate Accords and recent multilateral trade agreements, this Essay analyzes these constitutional pathways to an international pandemic agreement, and how current statutory frameworks and Article II authority may shape the feasibility of the U.S. joining one or more international agreements of varying binding effect.