Government intervention in the capital allocation process: Excess employment as an IPO selection rule in China

We study the role of local employment as a selection criterion for initial public offerings (IPOs) in China. Using a large dataset of firms that are eligible for a public offering, we find that firms' contributions to the local labor market increase the probability of an IPO event. Digging deeper into the mechanism, we find that the results hold for private firms but not for state-owned firms that, presumably, are already in compliance with the high employment levels preferred by local officials. We also uncover that firms which contribute more to employment receive more government bank loans in the period leading up to the IPO event. A final set of results sheds light on the economic ramifications of government involvement in the IPO selection process. We find that firms which contribute more to local employment underperform relative to other firms after going public. Our findings shed light on how a political system known for its interventionistic government policies affects behavior in the private sector.