Proactive Eavesdropping via Jamming Over Short Packet Suspicious Communications With Finite Blocklength

Short packet communications play key roles in the Internet-of-Things. Conventional Shannon’s coding theorem is not applicable for short packet communications, and the achievable rate in the finite blocklength regime is related to the blocklength and the decoding error probability. Contrary to conventional physical layer security, wireless information surveillance assumes that the communication users are suspicious users and the eavesdroppers are legitimate monitors, and proactive eavesdropping via jamming has been proposed to improve the eavesdropping performance. Existing works on proactive eavesdropping ignored the scenario when the suspicious users adopt the short packet communications. Thus, this paper tries to develop effective proactive eavesdropping schemes suitable for the short packet suspicious communications. Under the truncated channel inversion power allocation and the modified constant power allocation policies at the suspicious source, the problems of jamming power allocation for maximizing the monitoring success probability subject to the average transmit power constraint at the monitor are investigated. Based on the Dinkelbach-type algorithm, the Lagrange duality method and a novel tractable approximate expression for the decoding error probability, we derive suboptimal solutions to the problems. Simulation results demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed solutions compared to various benchmark algorithms in existing literature.