Promoting knowledge sharing in the workplace: Punishment v. reward

Abstract Previous studies have noted that both punishment and reward can improve knowledge sharing to some extent; however, which one better promotes knowledge sharing remains debatable. Furthermore, it has yet to be thoroughly investigated whether a higher fine or a higher bonus precipitates better knowledge sharing performance. Here, we analyze knowledge sharing behavior by introducing four models of the public goods game (PGG) with the following incentive mechanisms: no incentive, a reward, a punishment, and a mix of reward and punishment, to determine which mechanism best promotes knowledge sharing in the workplace. Each model is then used to simultaneously consider difficult pressures and coworkers’ attitudes in a work environment. A simulation was conducted using the Java programming language, the results of which revealed the following: (1) Both punishment and reward can promote knowledge sharing behavior, but punishment is more effective than reward for sustaining knowledge contribution. Contrary to what was expected, the mixed mechanism is not as efficient as punishment or reward in facilitating knowledge sharing. (2) The amount of the fine/bonus is nonlinearly related to the quality of the knowledge shared. Thus, we suggest that the moderate fine/bonus is a satisfactory choice for organizations to promote knowledge sharing. (3) Peer pressure, time pressure, and coworkers’ attitudes all contribute crucially to the equilibrium of the PGG. (4) It is easier to improve and maintain knowledge contribution when the facilitating influences, e.g. peer pressure, from the work environment are stronger than the inhibiting ones, e.g. time pressure. Our research not only promotes an understanding of the influences of incentive mechanisms and the effects of pressures and team atmospheres on knowledge sharing, but also provides practical implications for organizations and leaders.