Security modelling and formal verification of survivability properties: Application to cyber-physical systems
2020
Abstract The modelling and verification of systems security is an open research topic whose complexity and importance needs, in our view, the use of formal and non-formal methods. This paper addresses the modelling of security using misuse cases and the automatic verification of survivability properties using model checking. The survivability of a system characterises its capacity to fulfil its mission (promptly) in the presence of attacks, failures, or accidents, as defined by Ellison. The original contributions of this paper are a methodology and its tool support, through a framework called surreal . The methodology starts from a misuse case specification enriched with UML profile annotations and obtains, as a by-product, a survivability assessment model (SAM). Using predefined queries the survivability properties are proved in the SAM. A total of fourteen properties have been formulated and also implemented in surreal , which encompasses tools to model the security specification, to create the SAM and to prove the properties. Finally, the paper validates the methodology and the framework using a cyber-physical system (CPS) case study, in the automotive field.
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