Action perception and motor imagery: Mental practice of action

Abstract Motor cognition is related to the planning and generation of actions as well as to the recognition and imagination of motor acts. Recently, there is evidence that the motor system participates not only in overt actions but also in mental processes supporting covert actions. Within this framework, we have investigated the cortical areas engaged in execution, observation, and imagination of the same action, by the use of the high resolution quantitative 14 C-deoxyglucose method in monkeys and by fMRI in humans, throughout the entire primate brain. Our data demonstrated that observing or imagining an action excites virtually the same sensory-motor cortical network which supports execution of that same action. In general agreement with the results of five relevant meta-analyses that we discuss extensively, our results imply mental practice, i.e. internal rehearsal of the action including movements and their sensory effects. We suggest that we actively perceive and imagine actions by selecting and running off-line restored sensory-motor memories, by mentally simulating the actions. We provide empirical evidence that mental simulation of actions underlies motor cognition, and conceptual representations are grounded in sensory-motor codes. Motor cognition may, therefore, be embodied and modal. Finally, we consider questions regarding agency attribution and the possible causal or epiphenomenal role the involved sensory-motor network could play in motor cognition.